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INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001 left the
whole country not only in shock, but in a high state of vulnerability.
1

American citizens around the world felt unsafe and desperately wanted to hold

the attackers accountable for the innocent lives they took and the carnage they
caused.2 Following the attacks, Congress authorized the use of a military force
policy known as “targeted killings,” which became the essential tactic used to
pursue those behind the 9/11 attacks.3 To execute targeted killings, the United
States (U.S.) government began employing unmanned aircrafts known as
drones.4
When President Barack Obama took office, he not only inherited a
country mired in a historically bad financial downturn, but a country also waging
two “intractable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”5 While elected partly on the
promise to swiftly end the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and bring the
American troops home, it eventually became clear the Obama administration had
actually entered a third covert war when the administration escalated drone
strikes in Pakistan.6 In recent years, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) have employed targeted killings as part of combat operations not
only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia.7
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There are two principal techniques of targeted killings: kill or capture
raids and air strikes. This Article focuses on the latter.8 Part I of this Article will
focus on different types of new technology the U.S. employs to conduct lethal
operations abroad. Part II will analyze the legality behind the U.S. actions when
conducting drone-based targeted killings abroad. Finally, Part III will discuss
whether judicial intervention could prompt accountability for targeted killing
operations in foreign territories.

I.

THE USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY FOR TARGETED KILLINGS
The U.S. has long used targeted killings as a combat method.9

However, in recent years, this practice gained some unwanted media
coverage, because the U.S. military and CIA were using drone strikes and
kill/capture raids to engage in these operations.10 This Part first provides
an overview of drones used by the U.S. government and then an overview
of the law governing foreign targeted killing operations.
A. Drones defined and their use in U.S. targeted killing operations
The U. S. Department of Defense defines drones as an “unmanned
powered aerial vehicle (UAV) that does not carry a human operator, …
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.”11
While drones have recently become a central focus in military
strategies, and in the public eye as well, they are not a new creation.
Drones have been around since at least the 1950’s, and some theorize they
were invented soon after World War II ended.12 During the Vietnam War
and the 1991 Gulf War, drones were used merely for reconnaissance
missions, to gain information about an enemy or potential enemy.
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However, after the 9/11 attacks, drone technology improved dramatically
and at the beginning of the 2000s, the U.S. was ready to employ drones
“as launch vehicles for missiles.”14
To satisfy the U.S. government’s need for low-cost, low-risk crossborder aircrafts, the role of drones evolved rapidly from launch vehicles to
attack vehicles.15 Drones became the cheapest, easiest, and safest means of
fighting terrorism.16 Because of drones, soldiers would no longer need to
2

expose themselves to battle conditions as drones could be piloted from the
safety of a base far from the action.17 Additionally, targeted killings are
easily accomplished, because combat drones’ attack capabilities provide a
unique “target strike” opportunity because of the nature of the unmanned
aircraft size and range.18
Since 2009, the U.S. has deployed two types of combat drones for
its targeted killings: the MQ-1 (AKA predator) and the MQ-9 (AKA
reaper).19 A predator drone can operate on a “5,000 by 75-foot (1,524
meters by 23 meters) hard-surface runway with clear line-of-sight to the
ground data terminal antenna.”20 The ground data terminal antenna
enables communication for takeoff and landing. 21
A predator drone has an aircraft system remotely piloted by a crew
consisting of a pilot, who controls the aircraft and commands the mission;
an enlisted aircrew member, who operates the sensors and weapons; and a
mission coordinator, if the situation requires it.22 A predator drone’s fully
operational system also includes “a four sensor/weapon controlled by a
ground control station.”23 The ground control station manages the predator
drone’s operations “via a line of sight data link or a satellite data link for
beyond line of sight operations.”24
A targeted predator drone killing can be so accurate a person could
be resting on his back, while a predator drone hovers undetected over a
house 2 miles or so away.25 A drone can then target a person’s entire body
while remotely launching hellfire missiles “causing a fiery blast in real
time.”26 In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in
Pakistan, was the victim of a targeted killing conducted by a predator
drone that tracked his whereabouts to his relative’s house before it
launched a hellfire missile towards him.27
A reaper drone is similar to a predator drone in design and
function, but it is a newer and more heavily-armed version of the
Predator.28 While a reaper drone is also a remotely piloted aircraft, it is
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used for long-endurance missions. Specifically, a reaper drone is used
primarily against “dynamic execution targets.”29
A reaper drone has an operational altitude of 50,000rft (15,000 m)
and a range of 1,000dnmi (1,150 mi; 1,850 km).30 Additionally, a reaper
drone’s high loitering time, “range sensors, multi-mode communications
suite, and precision weapons,” give this aircraft the ability to execute
strikes on highly sensitive targets.31 It is considered especially useful for
surveillance and support of ground troops.

32

As of 2009, the U.S. has at

least 100 predator drones and 15 reaper drones.33
Drones are used for targeted killings, because they are thought to
be a more efficient weapon that allows targeting dangerous terrorists,
without endangering American lives.34 The results do support this theory
as hundreds of dangerous militants have been killed by unmanned
aircrafts.35 For example, high ranking leaders of terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been targeted and killed.36
Two primary examples of these targeted killings are (1) the
successful killing of Osama bin Laden, the figure behind the 9/11 attacks,
and (2) the September 2011 drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki, an
American-born Yemeni cleric and an al-Qaeda propagandist in the
Arabian Peninsula.37 By 2009, targeted killings escalated through an
increase in unmanned drone strikes on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in the
Middle East.38 In all, more than 300 covert drone attacks have been
registered in Pakistan alone.39
The Obama administration has asserted the U.S. Government
drone-based missile strikes comply with international law. 40 However, the
lack of credible or verifiable information undermines their assertions.41
The practice of targeted killings assumed on a systematic basis and
without verifiable information is severely alarming and regressive.42 The
use of drones and targeted killings policies could irreparably hurt the
international legal framework created to uphold the most basic and
valuable protections for the right to human life and dignity.43
4

As the CIA and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Special
Operations

forces

increase

their

involvement

in

carrying

out

extraterritorial targeted killings through drone-based missile strikes, the
inquiry about compliance with international humanitarian right to life law
and international humanitarian law is critical.44
B. What legal framework of International law should lethal force be
used?45
International humanitarian law allows for the use of lethal force
against fighters and terrorist groups, or civilians who are directly linked to
hostilities.46 However, it is difficult to determine whether it is lawful to
use lethal force against an individual who participates in hostilities when
the individual, after delivering an attack, travels from a State engaged in
conflict to a State not in conflict.47
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has opined
about this issue, asserting that under International humanitarian law, such
a person “should not be considered a legitimate target under the laws of
war.”

48

The reasoning behind this opinion is that allowing otherwise

would mean no country could exclude their land from battlefield
consideration.49 Additionally, the ICRC fears any individual moving from
one country to another could be considered a legitimate target under
International humanitarian law, regardless of the territory where he is
found.50 While the ICRC acknowledges individuals should be accountable
for their actions, they are attempting to avoid the issue of disregarding
territorial boundaries thereby treating the whole world as a battlefield.51
While weapon treaties, or legal instruments of International
humanitarian law, do not specifically mention drones, the use of drones as
a weapon system in armed conflict is considered subject to the rules of
International humanitarian law.

52

Under International humanitarian law,

weapons capable of more precise attacks, minimizing civilian casualties
and damages to infrastructure, are given preference over weapons that do
not.53 Specifically, this law requires precautions be taken to avoid civilian
5

casualties and destruction of infrastructure. Parties must stop attacks if
casualties or harm to not-targeted individuals are anticipated.54
Another law governing targeted killings and the use of drones is
the universal right to life, which under International law is broadly
regarded as the supreme right.55 The deprivation of human life “has been
described as a rule of customary International law.”

56

Furthermore, the

majority of State constitutions recognize a right against life deprivation.
Under International humanitarian right law unlawful killings are
universally criminalized as violations of the right to life war crimes, or
crimes against humanities.57
Under International humanitarian rights law, the intentional
premeditated killing of a human being is unlawful.58 However, depending
on the circumstances, intentional killings may not be considered against
the law when it is the only way to respond to an imminent threat to life
(e.g. hostage situations).59 “A well-established principle of International
law is that International humanitarian right to life” applies during an
armed conflict, “as a complement to International humanitarian law.”60
Further, International law allows for the use of lethal force in self-defense
when responding to an armed attack “as long as that force is necessary and
proportionate.”61
II.

THE LEGALITY OF
KILLINGS ABROAD

THE

U.S.’ DRONE-BASED TARGETED

Policymakers, scholars, and the media frequently debate the
legality of the U.S. drone-based targeted killings.62 This debate has been
centered among two theories of law.63 The first theory, Jus ad bellum,
governs the necessity and proportionality of the conduct of states and nonstate actors considering whether to engage in war and armed conflict.”64
The second theory, Jus in Bello, governs “the conduct of individuals and
units toward combatants, non-combatants, property, and the environment."
65

Jus ad bellum and jus in bello “were declared to be distinct normative

universes, in order to postulate the principle that all conflicts shall be
fought humanely, irrespective of the cause of armed violence.”66
6

A. Jus Ad bellum analysis
The U.S. government has reported the actions taken under the
targeted killing’s policy “are consistent with the International law
requirement for the use of self-defensive force.”67 President Obama’s
administration has asserted that the U.S. does not need to make a
proportionality-jus ad bellum analysis before each targeted drone strike
undertaken since no more force than reasonably required to overcome the
threat is being used.
Additionally,

on

May

23,

2013,

during

a

speech

on

counterterrorism, President Obama stated that the U.S. targeted killing
policy is permissible against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their associate
forces.68 President Obama indicated that because a non-international
armed conflict exists between the U.S. and these organizations, the U.S.
government can “engage in at-will targeting of enemy belligerents,” under
both domestic and international law.69 However, these justifications do not
explain whether the hostilities between U.S. and Al-Qaeda rise to the level
of an armed conflict, and if an armed conflict does exist how should the
scope of the conflict be delimited.70
The simple act of targeting individuals using drones intrinsically
infringes upon international law since it is hard to determine, “who may
lawfully be targeted and on what basis,” who is authorized to carry out the
killing, and “the extent to which less-than-lethal measures are required to
be used.”71
Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s explanations, it is still
unknown what legal basis the U.S. operates,72 especially since the U.S. has
embarked on impermissible strikes “beyond the scope of any existing
armed conflict.”73 For example, the 2009 targeted killings in Pakistan
using predator drones, a country with which the U.S. is not at war and had
not consented to the U.S. use of force in its territory.74
Under the legal limitations of proportionality requirements of Jus
ad bellum, an argument could be made that the U.S. should first exhaust
7

all measures to capture insurgent suspects before employing targeting
killings to avoid violations to international laws.
B. Jus In Bello analysis
Under the Jus In Bello theory of law, the targeted killing tactics
used in certain drone-based operations are also evaluated for International
humanitarian law violations.75 Jus In bello limits the consequences of
armed conflicts on civilians not involved in armed conflicts, as well as,
infrastructure and the environment.76
A

controversial

argument

is

that

drones

are

inherently

indiscriminate, thus violating the “principle of distinction” upheld under
this theory of law.77 The U. S. government does not comment on or
acknowledge drone strikes that take place outside of hot battlefields, and
keeps secret the list of targeted killings, making it impossible to know the
actual number of civilian casualties. Additionally, because different
standards are used to target citizens and non-citizens, the derogation is
possible with regards to human rights instruments. However, absent
derogation, human rights obligations do apply in times of armed conflicts
under this theory of law.
Humanitarian organizations are concerned with the potential
psychological impact of drone strikes.78 One major problem is the level of
stress and mental health consequences drone strikes have on the
populations over which they hover.79 Specifically, the effect the constant
presence of the aircrafts in the skies have on non-targeted individuals.80
However, because the use of drones and drone strikes are performed under
high levels of security, it is impossible to accurately determine their
impact.81 This makes it imperative to require drones to make a distinction
between military targets and civilian casualties.82
Currently, the U.S. engages drones in operations targeting
individuals with a mere past or present involvement in planning attacks
regardless of whether or not specific evidence of imminent threat of attack
in fact exist.83 The target is generally an alleged terrorist or other insurgent
8

deemed dangerous “based on undisclosed intelligence, applied against
secret criteria.”84 These targets are then put on a list known as the
kill/capture list.85 In Afghanistan alone, the U.S. has “six different
kill/capture lists, with a total of thousands of names on them.”86 However,
because of the level of secrecy these operations and the kill/capture list
require, “the CIA will neither confirm nor deny their existence.”87
Non-supporters of these practices argue the U.S. targeting policy
degrades International humanitarian law and “undermines the legal
framework meant to protect human rights in armed conflict.”88 Among the
arguments made against targeting killings is that drone strikes are
assassinations, and therefore, not authorized under International law.89
However, supporters of drone-based targeted killings argue there is a
distinction between illegal assassinations, and the lawful targeting in
armed conflict of insurgents who represent a direct threat to the U.S.90
III.

ACCOUNTABILITY SOLUTION - JUDICIAL REVIEW
The courts could offer the best prospect of compelling

accountability for drone-related targeted killings.91 This may be
accomplished by developing principles overseeing the insertion of names
on kill/capture lists, by questioning the legality of the decision to kill, and
by prosecuting those who kill in circumstances not allowed by law.92 The
goal is to guarantee that matters involving national security are given
specific considerations by preventing intelligence agencies from
exercising their powers arbitrarily,93 and to provide legal recourse to “any
person whose rights are violated.”94
Some court systems have started to work on this issue.95 For
example, the Israeli Supreme Court established conditions where targeted
killings are authorized under the law.96 Additionally, the Israeli court has
insisted on retroactive investigations on each targeted killing instance, to
ensure it was pursuant to a lawful purpose.97 Similarly, the European
Court of Human Rights established extensive jurisprudence to satisfy the
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need of individualized remedies to stop intelligence agency’s practice of
human rights violations.98
Unlike Israel and Europe, the U.S. courts do not currently enforce
any form of judicial protections for these practices.99 It is close to
impossible for an average individual, whose rights have been violated, to
challenge the legality behind the actions of U.S. intelligence agencies,
because an individual seeking remedies in the U.S. court system must first
satisfy strict substantive and procedural standing requirements.100
The Maher Arar’s case illustrates this principle.101 Maher Arar, a
Canadian resident with double citizenship in Canada and Syria, was taken
into U.S. custody in 2002 from the John F. Kennedy airport in New York.
The U.S. government took Arar, because they believed he was involved
with al-Qaeda. Then, he was rendered to Syria, where he was allegedly
questioned and tortured for ten months.102 In 2009, Arar brought a civil
action against the U.S. government, but the Second Circuit dismissed the
case, because an appropriate remedy did not exist.103
The court also stated its concerns about inquiring into the work of
government agencies, foreign governments, as well as, potentially
embarrassing the U.S. by disclosing classified/secret information.104 The
court also relied on the separation of powers to dismiss the case, noting
that this kind of lawsuit involves topics beyond the “limited experience
and knowledge of the federal judiciary.”105
After the U.S. court ruling, the Canadian government got involved
and appointed an “independent commission of inquiry,” to look into
Arar’s case.106 In gathering evidence, the commission questioned over
seventy Canadian government officials and reviewed over 21,500
government documents.107 At the end of the investigation, the commission
prepared two factual reports with its findings: one confidential report with
a summary of the evidence including classified information; and a second
report with almost 400 pages of non-confidential evidence.108 After the
commission’s report was published, the Canadian Prime Minister issued
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an apology to Arar and compensated him based on the findings for C$10.5
million, plus legal fees.109
Another case dismissed by a U.S court was Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.110
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed this
case, because there was “no convincing basis upon which Al-Aulaqi’s
father could have standing to bring the case on behalf of his son.”111 AlAulaqi, a joint U.S. and Yemen citizen who resided in Yemen, was killed
by an AGM-114 Hellfire missile in September 2011, after the U.S.
Treasury Department allegedly labeled him a “Specially Designated
Global Terrorist” on a CIA kill list.112 The alleged U.S. Treasury
Department actions took place after AL-Aulaqi made statements calling
for “Jihad against the West and other related activities.”113 The U.S.
government never confirmed nor denied the alleged inclusion of AlAulaqi to the CIA kill list.114
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia cited the
political question doctrine in its dismissal.115 The court explained that
judicial review is not possible on these type of cases, because a court
cannot question a decision that the U.S. Constitution committed to the
political branches.116
CONCLUSION
While terrorist attacks concern countries around the world, it is
important to avoid letting a state of war against terrorism erode
accountability of unlawful killings. The U.S. and its intelligence agencies
do not have unlimited power to conduct lethal operations abroad,
especially without a formal declaration of war. Citizens of each country
have a right to due process of law before they are charged and killed by a
drone-based strike.
This Article provides a reminder that International humanitarian
law exists to govern unlawful assassinations; to require transparency and
accountability behind each drone based-targeted killing; and to call for a
more effective monitoring mechanism that efficiently examines human
11

rights violations associated with new technologies such as unmanned
drones.
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